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Abstract: We provide experimental evidence of workers’ ingratiation by opinion conformity 
and of managers’ discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions.  
In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers’ performance at a task and opinions 
before assigning unequal payoffs. In the Ingratiation treatment, workers can change their 
opinion after learning that held by the manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also 
change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which gives a measure of non-strategic 
opinion conformism. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as overall, ingratiation is 
effective.  Indeed, managers reward opinion conformity, and even more so when opinions 
cannot be manipulated.  Additional treatments reveal that ingratiation is cost sensitive and 
that the introduction of performance pay for managers as well as a less noisy measure of 
performance increase the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, without 
eliminating the reward of opinion conformity.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores how interpersonal influence activities affect the assignment of rewards 
within a hierarchy.  We study employees’ ingratiatory behavior directed at superiors who 
have discretion in the assignment of earnings.  Ingratiation consists of various strategies 
including opinion conformity, self-presentation and other-enhancement.
1
  This paper 
considers the first strategy.  In a work environment, ingratiation occurs when an employee 
aims to impress superiors by increasing his/her attractiveness.
2
 For example, using survey 
data from Forbes 500 companies, Westphal and Stern (2006) provide evidence that managers 
use interpersonal influence activity as a substitute for elite credentials to obtain boardroom 
appointments.  Ingratiation may result from a willingness to reduce social distance with 
managers and it does not necessarily originate in informational asymmetries, in contrast to the 
influence activities modeled by Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988).
3
   
Ingratiation has certainly been encouraged by the development of subjective appraisals of 
employees (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009).  Indeed, subordinates’ ingratiation and managers’ 
favoritism are the two sides of the same coin.  Ingratiation may be encouraged by the fact that 
managers frequently reward dimensions other than the strict job performance of workers.
4
  
                                                 
1
 In social psychology, ingratiation is defined as “a strategic attempt to get someone to like you in order to 
obtain compliance with a request” (Vaughan and Hogg, 2008) or as “a class of strategic behaviors employed by 
a person to make himself more attractive to another” (Wortman and Linsenmeier, 1977).  Opinion conformity 
consists of expressing preferences supporting the opinion held by a target person; self-presentation is a means of 
self-promotion; other-enhancement includes flattering and expressing favorable judgments of their target (Jones, 
1964).   
2
 Ingratiation is also thought to be widespread among politicians for the support of voters, citizens for reaching 
priority access to certain facilities, sellers for encouraging customers to buy, individuals for facilitating mating. 
3
 It also differs from collusion within organizations (Tirole, 1986) as it does not involve bribing the superior to 
obtain the desirable outcome.  In contrast to the “Yes Men” theory of Prendergast (1993), which provides a 
rationale for subordinates to conform to their superiors’ opinions by reporting what the superiors want to hear 
about employees’ efforts, ingratiation by opinion conformity is not restricted to information that directly 
influences a firms’ profit. 
4
 A survey, conducted in U.S. companies with over 1,000 employees, indicates that favoritism in workplace 
promotions is widespread: 84% of the 302 senior business executives interviewed online report that favoritism 
exists in their company, and 23% admit they have practiced it themselves (Gardner, 2011).  Favoritism is 
defined in the study as: “Preferential treatment of an employee for assignments, credit, opinion, influence, or 
advancement on the basis of factors that do not directly relate to a person’s ability to perform his or her job 
function, such as background, ideology or gut instincts.” 
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Prendergast and Topel (1996) have modeled favoritism in organizations as resulting from the 
unavailability of objective measures of workers’ performance. Subjectivity may lead 
evaluators to reward preferred subordinates arbitrarily.  In contrast, Bramoullé and Goyal 
(2011) explain that favoritism may exist even without introducing managers’ social 
preferences.  It is seen as the equilibrium of a repeated game, since it allows a social group in 
which favors are traded to retain more surplus within the group.  In a recent field experiment, 
Bandiera et al. (2009) have shown the importance of social connections in favoritism.  
Managers who are paid a fixed wage tend to favor the workers to whom they are socially 
connected, regardless of their ability.  Favoritism may be harmful for the firm’s performance 
because it pervades the information on which job assignments are made.  Levine et al. (2010) 
have shown that when employers have preferences that favor specific workers, they may end 
up hiring inefficient and too many workers. In addition, by distorting incentives, it may 
discourage the effort of workers who do not benefit from favors.
5
   
To the best of our knowledge, no study has so far investigated both employees’ 
ingratiatory behavior and managers’ favoritism simultaneously.  An important novelty of our 
paper is that we tie these two dimensions together to understand better their joint dynamics.  
Another novelty is that we provide empirical evidence on both employees’ strategic opinion 
conformity and managers’ favoritism, based on opinion proximity.  Indeed, we have found no 
empirical study in economics on ingratiation and on favoritism based on opinion 
conformity.
6,7
  As managers may interpret opinion conformity as a signal of reduced social 
distance, our study also sheds light on discriminatory processes based on social distance. 
                                                 
5
 Efferson et al. (2008) have shown, however, that in-group favoritism may also help populations of 
heterogeneous people to solve coordination problems. 
6
 In contrast, social psychologists have investigated ingratiatory behaviors extensively.  For meta-analyses, see 
notably Gordon (1996) and Higgins et al. (2003) and Appelbaum and Hughes (1998) for a survey. 
7
 Empirical tests of favoritism focus on demographic characteristics (Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Knowles et al., 
2001; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) or on home bias in sports (Kocher and Sutter, 2004; Garicano et al., 2005) 
and editing (Laband and Piette, 1994).  In addition to Bandiera et al. (2009), recent experimental studies have 
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Since reliable survey data on ingratiation and favoritism are hardly available, we have 
designed a laboratory experiment in which three workers have to perform a task while the 
manager has discretion on how to assign unequal payoffs to them.
8
  In the Baseline treatment, 
the manager can obtain information on the workers’ performance and on their opinions about 
a certain topic, before assigning payoffs.  Indeed, at the beginning of each experimental 
session, the participants have to report their opinion on four topics, related to artistic tastes 
and policy issues.  This captures the idea that in a work environment, people develop social 
relations with managers by exchanging ideas on topics that are not only related to the content 
of their jobs. This can influence the managers when they have to assign earnings or 
responsibilities.  Comparing the opinions of the manager and those of each worker gives a 
metric of their proximity.  We are therefore able to measure the respective weight of relative 
performance and opinion proximity in the assignment of payoffs. 
In our Baseline treatment, workers cannot change their opinion after learning that of the 
manager.  In contrast, in the Ingratiation treatment workers have the option of changing their 
opinion before the manager knows about it.  We exploit this change to identify whether 
workers expect managers to reward opinion proximity and whether less-able workers use it to 
compensate for low performance.  This effect is quantified by means of an individual 
ingratiation index.
9
  By comparing the managers’ decisions in these two treatments, we study 
whether managers behave differently when knowing that proximity may result from 
ingratiation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
investigated in-group/out-group discrimination based on personal relations or social distance in trust games (Falk 
and Zehnder, 2007; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Brandts and Sola, 2010), bargaining games (Zizzo, 
2011), or competition games (Filippin and Guala, 2011; Dutcher, 2012).  On social distance, see Akerlof (1997). 
8
 This is equivalent to considering that a manager’s effort is complementary to a worker’s effort and that the 
manager can spend more time working with a specific worker. 
9
 This index is inspired by the notion of the influence index in game theory that is used to study how influence 
leads a player to deviate from his inclination (Hoede and Bakker, 1982; Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2009, 2010, 
2011). 
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Opinion conformity is, however, not always strategic.
10
  To disentangle ingratiation and a 
pure taste for conformity, a third treatment, the Random treatment, has been designed.  The 
assignment of payoffs is now random and the manager passive, but workers are still allowed 
to change their opinions.  The difference in the ingratiation indices in the Random and the 
Ingratiation treatments measures the importance of strategic conformity. 
Since ingratiation and favoritism may lead to efficiency losses, we have designed three 
additional treatments to test the sensitiveness of ingratiation and favoritism to three policy 
interventions.  First, we test whether ingratiation resists the introduction of a financial cost 
linked to changing one’s opinion.  In workplace environments, increasing the cost of 
ingratiation may be obtained by increasing the awareness of managers, thus requiring more 
subtle strategies from ingratiators, or by making ingratiation more visible to other 
subordinates.  We expect to observe less ingratiation when a higher cost reduces its net 
benefit.  Second, we test the sensitiveness of ingratiation and favoritism to a reduction of 
noise in the measure of workers’ relative performance.  We replace an idiosyncratic random 
term in the content of the task by a common random term, which makes individual outputs 
more comparable.  In a real setting, this could be achieved via a stronger standardization of 
the content of tasks and a more accurate measure of individual performance.  We expect a 
reduction of favoritism but an indeterminate effect on ingratiation.  Third, we change 
managerial incentives from fixed pay to performance pay, by tying the manager’s 
compensation to the workers’ outputs.  By introducing a cost for favoritism, we expect 
managers to reward more performance and less opinion conformity.  A stronger alignment of 
                                                 
10
 In social psychology, conformity is mainly motivated by the search for social approval (Asch, 1951; Cialdini 
and Goldstein, 2004).  Neuroscientists have shown that the brain analyzes a deviation from the group opinion as 
a punishment (Berns, 2008; Klucharev et al., 2009).  Economists give three explanations for conformity. First, 
herding behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 
1992) result from informational deficits.  Second, in Bernheim (1994), conformity results from the impairment 
of status in case of departure from a social norm (see also Akerlof, 1980; Jones, 1984).  Third, in Katz and 
Shapiro (1986), acting similarly may create mutual positive externalities. 
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managerial incentives with the firm’s interests could possibly lead workers to reducing their 
ingratiatory behavior. 
Our main findings are as follows.  First, a majority of workers change their opinion after 
learning the manager’s opinion.  While a pure taste for conformity is also identified, most of 
this behavior is strategic.  Second, the ingratiation index and performance are negatively 
correlated.  The fear of not being a frontrunner in terms of performance may lead workers to 
compensate by expressing opinions that will make them more likeable in the eyes of the 
manager.  Ingratiation decreases in its moral costs depending on the topic and the strength of 
opinion.  More precisely, the ingratiation index is smaller when an individual values more his 
opinion, and is larger when opinions are related to highly debated policy issues.  The latter 
relationship could suggest that ingratiation is not only acquisitive (i.e. driven by the desire to 
access valuable resources at a minimal cost) but also protective (i.e. motivated by the 
willingness to prevent a possible sanction in case of a visible disagreement) (see Jones, 1964).   
Third, ingratiation does not disappear over time because workers learn that a significant 
proportion of managers reward opinion conformity.  If a majority of managers behave in 
accordance with a meritocratic principle and reward the most able individuals, a shorter social 
distance is also rewarded.  Managers discriminate against the individuals who express more 
distant opinions, especially when opinions are about much debated topics and when workers’ 
opinions are more conservative.  However, knowing that workers can conform strategically 
reduces the influence of social distance in the assignment of high payoffs.   
Fourth, the limited feedback about who gets the high payoff prevents a decline in the 
motivation of able workers who would observe that they are sometimes passed over by less 
able, ingratiating workers.  We find that imposing a financial cost for changing one’s opinion 
discourages ingratiation.  The introduction of performance pay for managers increases 
significantly the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, relative to opinion 
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proximity.  This result is consistent with Bandiera et al. (2009) who find that managerial 
performance pay increases the productivity of high ability workers, especially those who have 
no connection with the manager.  Performance pay does not, however, eliminate completely 
discrimination in favor of similarly-oriented workers and it does not affect ingratiatory 
behavior.  Finally, reducing the noise in the measure of workers’ relative ability also 
reinforces the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, but slightly less than 
managerial performance pay.   
Overall, our paper confirms the importance of social distance in strategic decision-
making and suggests directions for limiting the importance of ingratiation and favoritism.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we present a simple 
theoretical model.  Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures.  Section 4 
presents the experimental results.  Section 5 discusses these results and concludes. 
2. A MODEL OF INGRATIATION AND FAVORITISM 
2.1.  Description of the model 
We consider a model with a manager and workers, which allows us to analyze managers’ 
favoritism and workers’ ingratiation at the same time.  The manager’s task is to assign 
unequal earnings to the workers.  Two levels of payoffs to the workers are possible, H and L, 
where H > L and workers compete to get the winning prize, H.
11
  The manager has to choose 
which worker gets H, with L being assigned automatically to every other worker. 
It is assumed that before assigning the payoffs, the manager can observe both workers’ 
performance at a task and their opinions on some issues.  The performance of worker k is 
given by: 
yk = ek + k    
                                                 
11
 This aspect of the model is similar to a rank-order tournament with a winning-losing prize structure (Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981). 
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where ek measures the effort exerted by the worker or his skill, and k  is an idiosyncratic 
random or luck component drawn from a known distribution with a zero mean and variance 
σ2.  The worker’s cost of supplying effort is c(ek), with c’, c” > 0.  Each worker has his 
preliminary opinions on certain topics that are known neither to the manager nor to other 
workers.  The manager expresses publicly her opinions on the topics.  After learning about the 
manager’s opinion and performing the task, each worker reports his opinion.  The final 
(reported) opinion of the worker might differ from his initial opinion, which allows for 
ingratiatory behavior directed at the manager.   
The manager’s utility is given by: 
perfdistmm wwwu    
where wm is the manager’s own payoff, wdist denotes the payoff of the worker with the lowest 
distance between his opinion and the opinion of the manager, and wperf  denotes the payoff of 
the worker with the best performance. 0  and 0  measure the intensity of the 
manager’s preference for one of the two types of workers, respectively.  We do not impose 
any relation between α and β.     characterizes a manager who favors more workers who 
share more similar opinions, with a particular case of the opinion-oriented manager when 
0 .  Similarly,    describes a manager who favors the best performance more than 
opinion similarity.  This manager is called a meritocratic manager when 0 .  The case 
when    means that the manager has equal preference for both kinds of workers.  An 
indifferent manager does not pay attention to either performance or opinion and is 
characterized in the model by 0  .  We assume that 

,  are unknown to the workers.  
It should be noted that our model extends the framework of favoritism studied in Prendergast 
and Topel (1996), in which the manager observes only performance.       
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The degree of the worker’s ingratiation by opinion conformity is measured by the so-
called ingratiation index, which is defined similarly to the influence index in the framework 
of influence in a social network (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2009, 2010).  Let k
inid  denote the 
distance between the initial opinion of the worker k and the opinion of the manager, and 
 
d
fin
k
 
be the distance between the final (reported) opinion of the worker and the opinion of the 
manager.  For all 0kinid  and 
k
fin
k
ini dd   we define the ingratiation index by:
 12
 
]1,0[


k
ini
k
fin
k
ini
k
d
dd
I  
When ingratiation is possible (i.e. 0kinid ) the worker’s ingratiation is the choice of the 
ingratiation index Ik.
13
  The higher Ik is, the stronger is the worker’s ingratiation behavior. In 
particular, Ik=0 reports no ingratiation behavior and Ik=1 corresponds to perfect ingratiation.  
The cost function of ingratiation is given by: 

Ck(Ik )  (ck  ck
mo(s))Ik  
where ck is a financial cost (possibly equal to 0), and )(scmok  denotes the moral cost of 
ingratiation which is a function of the strength s of the worker’s opinion.  )(scmok  increases in 
s, i.e., the more important his personal opinion on a given topic is to the worker, the higher is 
his moral cost of ingratiation.
14
  Obviously, Ck (0) = 0 and 

Ck(1)  ck ck
mo(s).   
Let us determine now the workers’ utility.  By N we denote the set of workers, where its 
cardinality |N| = n.  The choice function of the manager is a function 

P, :R
n  R
n N  
which assigns to every vector of distances and performances (D,Y) one worker (the one 
                                                 
12
 Since each worker reports his final opinions to the manager after receiving a feedback on his performance, 
d
k
fin (and consequently Ik) depends on the performance yk.  To simplify the notation we do not add this 
dependence to the formula of Ik. 
13
 Equivalently, the ingratiation decision means the choice of the distance dkfin, since d
k
ini is given and known by 
the worker before he makes the ingratiation decision. 
14
 The moral cost may also depend on the specificity of the topic.  For simplicity, we do not add it to the 
theoretical model, although we take this into account in the experimental design.   
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.32
10 
 
selected for the wage H).  The vector (D,Y) is the 2n-vector, in which n’s first coordinates are 
distances between the final opinions of the workers and the opinion of the manager, and n’s 
last coordinates are the workers’ performances.  Since workers have to choose their 
ingratiation behavior without knowing parameters 

, , it is a problem of decision under 
uncertainty.  A state of nature corresponds to a pair ),(  .  The set of states of nature is 
therefore equal to 2
 R .  The act of the worker k is a function Rf
k
I k
:  such that: 






kYDPifecICL
kYDPifecICH
fu
kkk
kkkk
Ik k ),()()(
),()()(
)),((),(
,
,


   
The worker’s decision is the ingratiation index Ik that maximizes his expected utility:  
))),(((maxarg , 
k
Ik
I kk
fuE , where 

E, (uk( fIk
k( , )))  uk( fIk
k ( , ))p( , )d d  
with the probability distribution of ),(   denoted by ),( p .   
2.2.  Behavioral hypotheses  
The theoretical model delivers some behavioral predictions about ingratiation, favoritism, and 
the impact of three policies (the improvement of the measurement accuracy of relative 
performance, the introduction of a financial cost of ingratiation, and the introduction of 
managerial performance pay).   
On the worker’s side, there is a trade-off in the worker’s utility uk: the worker may increase 
his ingratiation index Ik in the hope of receiving the payoff H, but by doing so he bears a 
higher cost.  Can ingratiatory behavior be advantageous?  Let the worker’s performance be 
equal to
kkk ey 
 .  Given 
ky , let ))),(((maxarg , 
k
Ik
I
k k
k
fuEI   with the value )( kk IC  of 
the corresponding cost function.   We expect that some workers choose 0kI .  For 0
k
inid  
and the states of nature )0,(  and ),(   with   close to 0, the choice 0kI  could lead to 
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kYDP ),(,  and to the worker’s utility )( kk ecLu  .  Choosing a sufficiently larger 
0kI  to end up with kYDP ),(,  would give the higher utility )()( kkkk ecICHu   if 
the financial and moral costs of ingratiation are sufficiently small, i.e., if 
k
mo
kk
I
LH
scc

 ))(( .   We therefore express the following prediction: 
Proposition 1: Provided the costs of ingratiation are sufficiently low, the worker should 
report opinions that reduce the distance with the manager.   
What change of the ingratiation index can be expected if the worker’s performance 
increases?  Suppose that the worker’s performance is 
ky  and is higher than 

ky , and results 
from a higher effort  kk ee , i.e., )()(
 kk ecec .  If the improved performance does not lead to 
a switch from kYDP ),(,  to kYDP ),(, , then the new ingratiation index kI   should be 
smaller, otherwise the worker’s utility would decrease.  However, if the increase in 
performance switches utility from ))()((   kkk ecICL  to ))()(( kkk ecICH  , then the new 
ingratiation index should not necessarily decrease.  More precisely, the worker’s utility will 
not decrease with the new (higher) performance if 




 kmo
kk
kk
k I
scc
ecLecH
I
)(
))(())((
.  
Hence, indeed  kk II  when ))(())((
 kk ecLecH , but when ))(())((
 kk ecLecH  
both directions of change in the ingratiation index are possible.   
Proposition 2:  Depending on the relation between H, L, and the costs of effort, an increase 
in worker’s performance should usually (although not always) decrease ingratiation.   
How does an increase in the costs of changing opinions affect the ingratiatory behavior?  
Since the worker does not want to decrease his utility, i.e., to increase the value of 
  k
mo
kkkk IsccIC ))(()( , an increase in the financial or moral cost will lead to the choice of a 
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smaller ingratiation index.  In particular, an increase in the strength of opinion s will give a 
smaller ingratiation index, since )(scmok  is increasing in s.  We then have:  
Proposition 3:  Increasing the costs of ingratiation decreases ingratiation.   
On the manager’s side, we are interested in observing if both opinion-oriented and 
meritocratic managers exist, i.e., if both 0  and 0  are identified in the experiment, 
and in which proportion.  Since every manager should, in principle, care about good 
performances as they represent the firm’s interests, we expect that the case of 0  is rare.  
We predict then the following: 
Proposition 4:  The manager’s preference should be expressed rather by 0  than by 
0 . 
The parameter   that measures the intensity of the manager’s preference for opinion 
proximity should be lower when the manager is sure that workers can change their opinion.  
We make the following statement: 
Proposition 5:  Introducing the possibility of ingratiation decreases .     
The parameter   measures the intensity of the manager’s preference for performance.  
Consequently, an improvement of the accuracy of measuring relative performance of the 
worker should increase  .  Precisely, accuracy is improved if one replaces the idiosyncratic 
error term by a common shock in the definition of individual output (yk = ek + ε); indeed, the 
difference in relative performance between workers now depends only on effort and skill and 
no longer on personal luck.  Similarly, if we relate the manager’s payoff to the performance 
of the workers, then the manager should focus more on the workers’ performance and less on 
opinions.  Introducing managerial performance pay yields a new payoff function, such as: 
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  with 0w  a fixed wage, yk  the performance of worker k, and γ a multiplier of 
workers’ performance.  This leads us to the following statement. 
Proposition 6: Improving the accuracy of relative performance measures and introducing 
managerial performance pay both increase  . 
3. THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Let us describe first how we elicited opinions before introducing each treatment and the 
procedures used. 
3.1.  Elicitation of opinions 
In the first part of each session, we elicited the participants’ opinions on four topics 
displayed in random order.  As we suspect ingratiation to be domain-dependent, we chose two 
topics related to tastes and two others related to highly debated policy issues.  Specifically, 
the participants had to look at a naïve art painting and to listen to a piece of reggae music, 
each during a minimum of 20 seconds and a maximum of two minutes.  Then, they had to rate 
their taste for the painting and the music on a scale ranging from 1 (“I hate it”) to 100 (“I 
adore it”).  They also had to rate their opinion on two statements: “One should introduce a 
carbon tax to change the course of global warming” and “One should regularize illegal 
immigrants”, between 1 (“I am extremely unfavorable”) and 100 (“I am extremely 
favorable”).  They were informed that their responses were anonymous but would be used in 
the next parts of the session with no additional information. 
Since our model assumes that ingratiation is negatively correlated with the strength of 
one’s opinion (as a measure of the moral cost of ingratiation), participants had to indicate the 
importance of each response on a 10-level Likert scale between 1 (“my answer has no real 
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value for me; I could have answered completely differently”) and 10 (“my answer represents 
a lot to me”).  Answers were not incentivized because of the policy-related questions.   
3.2.  Main treatments 
Our experiment included three treatments called Baseline, Ingratiation, and Random.  Each 
treatment consists of 12 periods. 
Consider the Baseline first.  At the beginning of each period, groups of four were formed 
randomly.  Each group included one manager (“participant A”) and three workers 
(“participants B”).  Roles were assigned randomly and they were kept constant throughout the 
session.  In each period, the workers had to perform a task.  The task consisted of answering 
two questions taken from a trivia quiz on general knowledge; the random draw of questions 
was i.i.d and this was common information.  The manager had to assign payoffs to the 
workers, namely one payoff of 10 points (with a conversion rate of 18 points = €1) and two 
payoffs of 5 points.  The manager was paid a fixed wage of 12 points.  A fixed wage allows 
us to observe the natural inclination of the manager for meritocracy or for opinion proximity.   
Each period had three stages.  In the first stage, groups were formed and workers were 
informed about their manager’s opinion on one randomly selected topic (painting, music, 
carbon tax statement or immigration statement).  In the second stage, workers performed the 
task.  It was common knowledge that questions varied across workers.  Each worker was only 
informed of his own score (0, 1, or 2, corresponding to the number of correct answers in the 
quiz).
15
  In the third stage, the manager chose which workers received the high payoff.  She 
could press two buttons for free before assigning payoffs.  One button was for asking 
information about each worker’s score and the other one for asking their opinion on the issue 
                                                 
15
 Imposing a random assignment of questions to each player is equivalent to introducing an idiosyncratic 
random term in the payoff function.  This random term and the limited possible difference in performance 
between workers aim at recreating some noise in the measurement of relative performance.  This is relaxed in a 
further treatment. 
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selected in the first stage.  Each button was randomly disposed on the left or the right of the 
screen in order not to force the manager’s attention on any information.  At the end of each 
period, workers were informed about their payoff, but not on whether the manager had asked 
for information.  Groups were rematched at the beginning of the next period.
16
  This treatment 
allowed us to determine the respective influence of relative opinion and performance on 
assigning payoffs. 
There is only one difference between the Ingratiation treatment and the Baseline: workers 
were allowed to change their initial opinion before it was made available to the manager and 
after receiving a feedback on their score.  They were reminded about the manager’s and their 
own initial opinions; they could change opinion by moving a slider.  The manager knew that 
workers could modify their opinion but she only observed the reported opinions without 
knowing whether they had been changed or not.  Note that the managers could not change 
their own opinion.  As before, workers did not receive any information about other workers’ 
opinions or scores.  This treatment allowed us to determine i) the value of the ingratiation 
index and ii) its relationship with performance, opinion topic, and the strength of opinions.  
Comparing the Baseline and the Ingratiation treatments indicates whether the respective 
weights of relative scores and opinions differ when managers know that opinions can be 
manipulated strategically. 
Workers may change their opinion strategically but also because they like conforming to 
the opinion of a high status person (the manager).  To disentangle these two reasons, the 
Random treatment is different in one way to the Ingratiation treatment.  Workers can still 
change their opinion but managers are now passive: workers’ payoffs are assigned randomly.  
In this context, we assume that a change in opinion is driven by a taste for conformity.  
                                                 
16
 Using a stranger matching protocol eliminates by design that managers favor workers with more similar 
opinions to build reciprocal relationships based on favoritism and favor rendering.   
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Comparing Ingratiation and Random treatments indicates to what extent opinion conformity 
is strategic. 
Each participant played in two treatments.  In some sessions, they played the Baseline 
followed by the Ingratiation treatment.  In other sessions, they played the Ingratiation 
treatment followed by the Random treatment.  We controlled for order effects by reversing 
the order of treatments in other sessions. 
3.3.  Policy interventions 
We tested the sensitiveness of ingratiation and favoritism to three policy interventions: a 
reduction of the noise in the measurement of relative performance; the introduction of a 
financial cost for changing opinion; and a shift of managerial compensation from a fixed 
wage to performance pay.  Each intervention corresponded to a new treatment. 
In the Baseline-Policy 1 and Ingratiation-Policy 1 treatments, we increased the precision 
of relative performance measures.  The three workers then received the same trivia quiz that 
consisted of four questions of the same level of difficulty instead of two.  This reduced the 
role of idiosyncratic luck in relative performance.  Comparing these treatments with the 
original ones indicates whether, when the score is more informative of the worker’s relative 
ability, i) the influence of scores is reinforced while that of opinions decreases and ii) the 
expected negative correlation coefficient between ingratiation indices and scores increases. 
The Ingratiation-Policy 2 and Random-Policy 2 treatments introduce a fixed cost for 
changing one’s opinion.  It costs 1 point for the worker to change opinion regardless of the 
size of the change (which corresponds to 20% of the low payoff and 8.33% of the high 
payoff).  Comparing these treatments with the original ones indicates whether: i) ingratiation 
is cost-sensitive, and ii) managers pay more attention to opinions when ingratiation is costly. 
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In the Baseline-Policy 3 and Ingratiation-Policy 3 treatments, we introduced performance 
pay by tying the manager’s payoff to the sum of the three workers’ scores.  Under 
performance pay, the manager’s payoff function becomes:  



3
1
0 5.010
k
k
k
km yyww   
 
The parameter 0  captures the strength of managerial incentives.  It has been chosen so 
that on average the managers earn 12 points, as in the main treatments.
17
  We tested whether 
such a change in managerial incentives: i) leads managers to reward more scores and less 
opinion proximity than under a fixed compensation; and ii) as a consequence, leads to a 
reduction in ingratiatory behaviors. 
3.4.  Procedures 
The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE-NG software (Zeiliger, 2000).  29 
sessions were conducted at the laboratory of the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique 
(GATE), Lyon, France.  Between 12 and 20 individuals took part in each session, for a total of 
500 participants invited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004).  In total, we observed 125 
“managers” and 375 “workers”.  The participants were undergraduate students from the local 
Engineering and Business schools.  Table A1 in Appendix 2 indicates the number of 
participants and the treatments played in each session. 
Upon arrival, the participants were randomly assigned to a terminal by drawing a tag from 
a bag.  Instructions for the elicitation of opinions were distributed and read aloud (see 
Appendix 1).  Headphones were placed at the disposal of the participants.  After all of them 
expressed their opinions on the four issues, instructions were distributed for the next part.  
                                                 
17
 An alternative would be to make the manager’s payoff depend on the score of the worker who receives the 
high payoff.  This would allow us to measure how much money managers are willing to forego to favor opinion 
conformity instead of performance.  This could be tested in an extension of the present paper.  Our less direct 
payoff function enabled us to test whether making the reference to performance more salient suffices to reduce 
favoritism.   
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After checking individually the understanding of the instructions by means of a questionnaire, 
roles were assigned and participants played the 12 periods of a given treatment with a random 
re-matching of groups after each period.  Then, the instructions for the 12 periods of a second 
treatment were distributed.  At the end of the session, after completing a demographic 
questionnaire, the participants were allowed to proceed to the payment room one by one.   
 At the end of the session, the payoffs of all the periods were added up and converted into 
Euro for payment. Sessions lasted on average 75 minutes, including the payment of 
participants, and each participant earned €14.78 on average, including a show-up fee of €4.  
 
4. RESULTS  
In this section, we first analyze the workers’ ingratiatory behavior.  Then we study whether 
and by how much opinion conformity matters relative to performance in the assignment of 
payoffs.  In a final sub-section we report the results of the policy interventions. 
4.1.  Ingratiatory behavior 
To measure opinion conformity and ingratiation, we first calculate the distance between the 
manager’s and the worker’s opinions at two different moments in the game.  We compare the 
initial distance between the opinions expressed preliminarily and the final distance between 
opinions after workers can change their opinion.  Table 1 reports summary statistics for each 
treatment indicating, for the cases in which initial opinions differ, the number of changes in 
opinions in each direction, the number of observations with perfect or almost perfect 
ingratiation, and the mean ingratiation index.
18
  Perfect ingratiation indicates a change in 
opinion designed to match exactly the opinion of the manager; almost perfect ingratiation 
corresponds to the cases in which the initial distance is higher than 2 and the final distance 
does not exceed 2.  The ingratiation index is calculated as the difference between the initial 
                                                 
18
  In the Random treatment, it would be formally more correct to name this index “conformity index”.  We 
retain the notion of an ingratiation index for both treatments for simplicity. 
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distance between the manager’s and the worker’s opinions and the final distance in opinions, 
divided by the initial distance.  It excludes the observations in which the final distance is 
greater than the initial distance. 
Table 1.  Summary statistics 
Treatments Baseline Ingratiation Random 
Same initial opinion as the manager’s 
Different initial opinion 
Total 
65 (4.75%) 
1303 (95.25%) 
1368 (100%) 
130 (4.63%)
ns 
2678 (95.37%)
 ns
 
2808 (100%) 
74 (5.14%)
ns
 
1366 (94.86%)
 ns
 
1440 (100%) 
Sub-sample of observations with a different initial opinion 
Change between final and initial distance 
- Increased distance 
- Same distance 
- Decreased distance 
Total  
 
- 
1303 (100%) 
- 
1303 (100%) 
 
167 (6.24%) 
995  (37.15%) 
1516 (56.61%) 
2678 (100%) 
 
116 (8.49%)
 ns
 
819 (59.96%)*** 
431 (31.55%)*** 
1366 (100%) 
Perfect ingratiation (same final opinion) 
Almost perfect ingratiation (same +/- 2) 
- 
- 
301 (11.24%) 
477 (18.57%) 
63 (4.61%)*** 
103 (7.72%)*** 
Mean ingratiation index - 0.42 (0.26) 0.19 (0.19)*** 
 
Note: The Table reports the significance of two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests comparing, in the upper part of the 
Table, each of the Ingratiation and Random treatments with the Baseline, and in all the other cases, the Random 
with the Ingratiation treatment.
19
   
ns
 indicates no significance and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   
 
Table 1 shows that in the Ingratiation treatment, slightly more than one third of the 
participants kept the same opinion after learning that it differs from that of the manager, while 
56.61% of the participants conformed with the manager’s opinion,  and 11.24% even matched 
the manager’s opinion perfectly.  An important part of this behavior is strategic, as in the 
Random treatment less than one third of the participants reduced the distance in opinions and 
perfect conformism represents only 4.61% of the observations.  
As a complement, Figure 1 represents the initial difference (i.e. the difference between 
the opinion of the manager and the initial opinion of the worker) on the x-axis, and on the y-
axis the final difference (i.e. the difference between the opinion of the manager and the 
opinion reported by the worker), for each observation in any period of the game.  The left- 
and right-hand panels are for the Ingratiation and the Random treatments, respectively.   
                                                 
19
 Strictly speaking, one session provides only one independent observation.  Here, the mean value of each 
variable per worker and per treatment is considered as one independent observation.  All the non-parametric 
statistics reported in this paper are two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests, using the same notion of an independent 
observation, unless specified otherwise. 
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Fig.  1.  Distribution of initial and final differences between the manager’s and worker’s 
opinions 
 
Figure 1 identifies four situations.  The diagonal indicates that opinions have not been 
changed.  The dots on the horizontal line corresponding to a final difference of zero indicate 
that the worker and the manager share the same opinion.  When the initial difference is not 
equal to zero, this reveals perfect ingratiation.  A third situation is represented by the few dots 
located below (above) the diagonal, when the initial difference is negative (positive): workers 
increase distance with the manager, which can be seen as anti-conformism (this is outside the 
scope of this study).  Almost all the other cases correspond to ingratiation or conformism.  
The two panels indicate that many workers change opinion in the Ingratiation treatment, 
while many observations lie on the diagonal in the Random treatment.   
Next, we analyze the determinants of the probability for a worker to increase, keep 
constant or decrease the distance in opinion with the manager.  We estimate multinomial 
Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the worker level.  Clustering is required 
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as each participant is observed 24 times.  The reference category is when the worker does not 
modify his initial opinion.  In Model (1), we pool the data from the Ingratiation and Random 
treatments and include a dummy variable for the Ingratiation treatment among the 
independent variables.  Model (2) is for the Ingratiation treatment and Model (3) for the 
Random treatment.  In the three models, the independent variables include the score, as we 
expect that ingratiation is more likely when workers perform poorly.  Regarding opinions, we 
include the distance between the manager’s and the worker’s initial opinion, the squared 
distance between initial opinions to allow for non-linearity, and the strength of the opinion 
reported in the preliminary part.  We allow ingratiation to differ according to the opinion 
topic, by including a dummy variable for each topic.  To measure whether the ordinal position 
of the worker’s opinion relative to that of the manager matters, we include “negative initial 
difference” variables indicating whether the worker’s opinion was more favorable than that of 
the manager. For the carbon tax statement or immigration statement, a negative initial 
difference is observed when the worker's opinion is more conservative than the manager's 
one.  We finally control for the order between treatments (with a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the Ingratiation treatment is played first, and 0 otherwise), the period in the treatment 
and the worker’s gender.  Table 2 reports the marginal effects. 
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Table 2.  Determinants of the probability of varying the distance in opinion with the manager 
- Multinomial Logit models with robust standard errors and clustering at the worker level 
 
Ref.  = no 
change in 
distance 
Ingratiation and Random 
treatments (1) 
Ingratiation treatment 
(2) 
Random treatment 
(3) 
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance  
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance 
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance 
Ingratiation 
treatment 
Score 
 
Initial distance  
Squared initial 
distance  
Strength of the  
initial opinion 
Topic:  
painting 
Negative initial 
diff.*painting 
Topic:  
migration 
Negative initial 
diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon 
tax 
Negative initial 
diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
 
Period 
 
Female 
-0.023*  
(0.013) 
-0.017*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
0.00004** 
 (<0.001) 
-0.003*  
(0.002) 
-0.021 
 (0.013) 
0.0004 
(0.018) 
-0.022* 
 (0.012) 
0.004 
 (0.020) 
-0.016  
(0.012) 
0.005 
 (0.018) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
0.280*** 
(0.029) 
0.007 
 (0.013) 
0.022*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.0002*** 
 (<0.001) 
-0.027*** 
 (0.006) 
-0.019  
(0.036) 
0.085*  
(0.047) 
0.123*** 
 (0.033) 
-0.116*** 
(0.041) 
0.047 
 (0.035) 
-0.063 
 (0.044) 
0.020 
(0.029) 
0.001 
 (0.002) 
0.050  
(0.040) 
- 
- 
-0.023*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
0.0004*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.003 
 (0.002) 
-0.011 
 (0.013) 
-0.0004 
 (0.018) 
-0.023** 
(0.012) 
-0.006  
(0.018) 
-0.027** 
 (0.012) 
0.040  
(0.027) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.002* 
 (0.001) 
-0.026** 
 (0.013) 
- 
- 
0.004  
(0.015) 
0.025*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.0002*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.025*** 
 (0.006) 
-0.037 
 (0.038) 
0.079 
 (0.048) 
0.111***  
(0.035) 
-0.086*  
(0.050) 
0.073** 
 (0.036) 
-0.116**  
(0.049) 
0.008 
(0.041) 
-0.0003 
 (0.003) 
0.037 
(0.042) 
- 
- 
0.003 
 (0.010) 
-0.003** 
 (0.001) 
0.0004** 
(<0.001) 
-0.004 
 (0.004) 
-0.036 
 (0.024) 
-0.001 
 (0.034) 
-0.018 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.042) 
0.009 
 (0.023) 
-0.051  
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.024) 
0.001 
 (0.002) 
-0.019 
 (0.025) 
- 
- 
0.002 
(0.019) 
0.012*** 
 (0.003) 
-0.0001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.026*** 
 (0.007) 
0.012 
 (0.052) 
0.082 
 (0.065) 
0.113** 
(0.049) 
-0.132** 
(0.053) 
-0.001 
 (0.051) 
0.016  
(0.069) 
0.028 
(0.052) 
0.004 
 (0.003) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
N (by category) 
Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
4004 (283-1814-1947)  
234 
-3233.292 
352.91 
0.0000 
0.109 
2678 (167-995-1516) 
234 
-2051.514 
309.45 
0.0000 
0.112 
1366 (116-819-431) 
120 
-1147.994 
64.54 
0.0000 
0.045 
 
Note: The table reports the marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  The number of observations (N) by 
category refers to the number of observations in which workers increase the distance, keep the 
distance stable and decrease the distance, respectively. 
 
 The estimates of Model (1) show that the Ingratiation treatment increases the 
likelihood of shifting one’s opinion towards the manager by 28%, compared to the Random 
treatment.  The score has no effect, which may be due to the expectation of ties.  In contrast, 
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the probability of reducing the distance increases with the initial distance, at a decreasing rate.  
As predicted, it is lower when the participant reported a stronger belief in his opinion.  
Interestingly, some topics are more likely to lead to ingratiation.  The statement about the 
regularization of illegal immigrants increases by 12.27% the likelihood of reducing the 
distance in opinion. This effect is asymmetric: it vanishes when the worker holds opinions 
that are more liberal than that of the manager. In other words, ingratiation/conformism is 
more likely when the worker is more conservative than the manager on this issue.
20
  When 
treatments are considered separately (Models (2) and (3)), the impact of the initial distance is 
twice as important in the Ingratiation than in the Random treatment (2.52% vs. 1.20% for 
each difference point, respectively). 
Table 2 also indicates that the probability of increasing the distance with the manager’s 
opinion is marginally lower in the Ingratiation treatment.  It is also reduced when the score is 
lower (only in the Ingratiation treatment), when the initial distance is higher (but non-
linearly), when workers hold stronger initial opinions and when opinions are related to policy 
issues in the Ingratiation treatment.  Women are also less likely to be anti-conformist. 
Next, to explain the magnitude of changes in opinion we estimate the determinants of the 
ingratiation index.  We estimate Tobit models with robust standard errors clustered at the 
worker level, since the index is censored both at 0 (no change in opinion) and at 1 (perfect 
ingratiation).
21
  By definition, we exclude anti-conformist workers and individuals who have 
the same initial opinion as the manager.  The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 
(except the distance in opinions since it is used to calculate the dependent variable).  Model 
                                                 
20
 This effect is not due to a specific distribution of the differences in initial opinions in this topic relative to the 
other topics (see Figure 1A in Appendix that displays the distribution of differences in opinions for each topic 
separately).  Nor is this due to a difference in the strength of opinion across topics.  Two-tailed Wilcoxon tests 
with each worker as an independent observation show that the strength of the opinion is not different between 
music (reference), migration policy (p=0.780) and carbon tax policy (p=0.437); opinions are less certain about 
painting (p<0.001). 
21
 We also estimated a two-step model to deal with a potential selection bias, with a Probit model with clustered 
robust standard errors in the first step, and an OLS model including the Inverse of Mill’s Ratio in the second 
step.  Since IMR was not significant, we report here the estimates of Tobit models accounting for censored data.   
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(1) pools the data from the Ingratiation and Random treatments, while Models (2) and (3) 
analyze each treatment separately.  Table 3 reports the estimates. 
Table 3.  Determinants of the ingratiation index - Tobit models with robust standard errors 
and clustering at the worker level  
 
Dependent variable: 
Ingratiation index 
 
Ingratiation and 
random treatments 
(1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment  
(2) 
Random  
treatment  
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Score 
Strength of the initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Negative initial diff.*painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative initial diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Constant 
0.531*** (0.058) 
-0.032 (0.022) 
-0.040*** (0.009) 
-0.040 (0.055) 
0.159** (0.073) 
0.240*** (0.052) 
-0.239*** (0.072) 
0.049 (0.055) 
-0.043 (0.073) 
0.010 (0.050) 
0.008** (0.004) 
0.080 (0.067) 
-0.098 (0.106) 
- 
-0.041* (0.023) 
-0.034*** (0.009) 
-0.038 (0.058) 
0.146* (0.078) 
0.236*** (0.057) 
-0.196** (0.077) 
0.061** (0.058) 
-0.054 (0.082) 
-0.032 (0.069) 
0.006 (0.004) 
0.037 (0.070) 
0.453*** (0.103) 
- 
-0.006 (0.043) 
-0.059*** (0.017) 
-0.058 (0.103) 
0.195 (0.126) 
0.236** (0.097) 
-0.338** (0.147) 
0.024 (0.111) 
-0.041 (0.145) 
0.099 (0.116) 
0.012 (0.008) 
0.185 (0.116)# 
-0.148 (0.179) 
N 
Left-/ right-censored obs. 
Nb of clusters 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
F / Prob>F 
Pseudo R
2
 
3761 
1814 / 364 
234 
-3454.293 
11.01 / 0.0000 
0.053 
2511 
995 / 301 
234 
-2489.009 
3.91 / 0.0000 
0.012 
1250 
819 / 63 
120 
-955.748 
2.67 / 0.002 
0.026 
Note: The data exclude the observations in which the worker has the same initial opinion as the manager and 
those in which the worker increased his distance with the manager.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  # indicates borderline significance 
at the 11% level. 
 
The higher index in the Ingratiation than in the Random treatment confirms the presence 
of strategic conformism.  It decreases consistently with the score, but only in the Ingratiation 
treatment.  The strength of the initial opinion reduces the magnitude of the change in both 
treatments but the coefficient is much larger in the Random than in the Ingratiation treatment, 
which suggests that people have less self-control in a more strategic environment.  In the 
Ingratiation treatment, the index increases when opinions are relative to the two policy 
statements.  In the Random treatment, the index is also higher for the workers who hold a 
more conservative opinion on migration policy, indicating that this highly debated topic leads 
to a greater need for conformism even in the absence of strategic considerations, perhaps due 
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to a social desirability bias.  Finally, the index of women (females) in the Random treatment 
is not far from reaching significance (11%).
22
 
To summarize, our analysis of workers’ behavior supports the following results: 
Result 1.  Many workers change their initial opinion strategically after learning about the 
opinion of the manager, in the hope of getting a favor.  We also observe a pure taste for 
conformity.  This supports Proposition 1. 
Result 2.  The ingratiation index is negatively correlated with performance.  This supports 
Proposition 2. 
The following result supports Proposition 3: 
Result 3.  A higher moral cost of conformity (a stronger initial opinion) reduces ingratiation.  
Those who reported initially more conservative opinions on highly debated issues have a 
consistently higher ingratiation index.   
We turn now to the managers to analyze the determinants of the payoff assignment. 
 4.2.  Performance and opinion proximity in payoff assignment 
89.25% of the managers asked information on both the workers’ scores and opinions in the 
Baseline; the corresponding values were 95.51% and 82.08% in the Ingratiation and the 
Random treatments, respectively.  Mann-Whitney tests conclude there is a significant 
difference between the Baseline, and both the Ingratiation treatment (p=0.052) and Random 
treatment (p=0.085) on the one hand, and between the Ingratiation and Random treatments 
(p<0.001) on the other hand. 
                                                 
22
 We estimated the same models on the restricted sample of workers who strictly reduced the distance in 
opinion with the manager.  The main changes in the results are an increased level of significance of the score in 
the Ingratiation treatment (at the 5% level) and a loss of significance of the topic variables in both treatments, 
except for the negative impact of having more liberal opinions on illegal immigration in the Ingratiation 
treatment. 
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Before estimating its individual determinants, we report descriptive statistics about the 
rate of success of a worker depending on his ranking in the triad, based on his performance 
and opinion distance.  The “score rank” 1 (3) is assigned to the worker who gets the highest 
(lowest, respectively) score in the triad; the “opinion rank” 1 (3) is assigned to the worker 
whose reported opinion is the closest (most distant, respectively) to the manager’s opinion.  
Ranks 2 are assigned to intermediate scores or opinions.  In the Baseline, the share of best 
performers who receive the high payoff is 42.49% (56.68% after exclusion of ties among the 
best performers); in the Ingratiation treatment, the percentages are 46.55 (Mann-Whitney test 
comparing Ingratiation and Baseline: p=0.259) and 67.57 (p=0.152).  Figure 2 displays the 
relative frequency of workers who get the high payoff depending on both ranks, by treatment. 
 
 
Fig.  2.  Percentage of workers receiving the high payoff by ranks and treatment 
 
 
For each opinion rank, Figure 2 indicates that having the first score rank always increases 
the likelihood of receiving the high payoff in the Baseline.  But it also shows that for any 
score rank, having the first opinion rank increases dramatically the probability of receiving 
the high payoff.  Only the first opinion rank allows a worker to earn more than a random 
assignment of payoff regardless of the score rank, whereas having the first score rank makes 
the worker better off than a random assignment only if he also holds the first opinion rank.  
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The Ingratiation treatment rebalances the influence of relative scores and opinions: the first 
opinion rank is rewarded considerably less than in the Baseline.  Now, only the first score 
rank allows a worker to earn more than a random assignment, except when he holds the third 
opinion rank.  Managers put less weight on opinions when they expect brownnosing. 
To study the determinants of which worker receives the high payoff we estimate 
conditional Logit models with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the 
manager level.  Indeed, the manager selects one worker conditional to the attributes of the 
choice alternatives, i.e. the characteristics of the other triad members.  The independent 
variables include score and opinion ranks (with Rank 2 as the omitted categories) and dummy 
variables for a tie in the score Rank 1 or in the opinion Rank 1. A variable interacts the first 
ranks in both opinion and score in case of a tie in the score rank to test whether the opinion 
rank is used to split the tie.  A similar variable is built for a tie in the opinion rank.  The 
independent variables also include the distance in opinion and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the worker reports exactly the same opinion as the manager. We also interact the 
distance in opinion and each topic,
23
 and dummy variables indicating a negative difference in 
opinion (i.e. a more negative opinion of the manager compared to the worker).  We only 
include the cases in which managers looked at both scores and opinions.  Table 4 displays the 
marginal effects of these variables in the Baseline (Model (1)) and the Ingratiation treatment 
(Model (2)).  We also report regressions excluding ties among the best performers.
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Topic variables are not directly included because there is no within-group variation.   
24
 Excluding ties leaves aside the data from the whole triad. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of which worker receives the high payoff – Conditional Logit models 
with robust standard errors clustered at the manager level 
 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of receiving  
the high payoff 
Baseline treatment (1) Ingratiation treatment (2) 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in score rank 1 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in score rank 1 
Score rank 1 
 
Tie in score rank 1 
 
Score rank 3 
 
Score rank 1 with a tie in opinion 
rank 1 
Opinion rank 1 
 
Tie in opinion rank 1 
 
Opinion rank 3 
 
Opinion rank 1 with a tie in score 
rank 1 
Reported distance  
in opinion 
Same opinion as the manager 
 
Final distance * painting 
 
Final distance * migration 
 
Final distance * carbon tax 
 
Negative final difference* painting 
 
Negative final difference* migration 
 
Negative final difference* carbon tax 
0.317*** 
(0.079) 
-0.232*** 
(0.085) 
-0.122#  
(0.079) 
0.045  
(0.146) 
0.223*** 
(0.058) 
-0.190*  
(0.102) 
-0.018  
(0.068) 
0.049  
(0.089) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.072  
(0.092) 
-0.004  
(0.004) 
-0.006*  
(0.003) 
-0.005*  
(0.003) 
-0.045  
(0.107) 
0.198*  
(0.106) 
-0.017  
(0.155) 
0.339*** 
(0.079) 
- 
 
-0.171* 
(0.090) 
0.034  
(0.216) 
0.251*** 
(0.073) 
-0.065  
(0.158) 
0.077  
(0.080) 
- 
 
-0.008*  
(0.004) 
-0.121  
(0.101) 
-0.003  
(0.007) 
-0.0004  
(0.004) 
-0.005  
(0.005) 
-0.091  
(0.128) 
0.097  
(0.129) 
-0.031  
(0.221) 
0.350*** 
(0.034) 
-0.222*** 
(0.077) 
-0.059 
(0.079) 
0.024 
(0.070) 
0.098*** 
(0.031) 
-0.165* 
(0.089) 
-0.021 
(0.039) 
0.039 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.023 
(0.040) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.069 
(0.059) 
-0.019 
(0.060) 
0.084 
(0.054) 
0.320*** 
(0.031) 
- 
  
-0.060  
(0.082) 
0.146  
(0.094) 
0.097** 
(0.044) 
-0.166 
 (0.133) 
-0.034  
(0.048) 
- 
 
0.002  
(0.002) 
0.030  
(0.065) 
-0.003  
(0.003) 
-0.007*  
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.169  
(0.105) 
-0.105  
(0.090) 
0.118  
(0.076) 
N / Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
1221 / 37 
-277.404 
236.31 
0.0000 
0.380 
552 / 35 
-129.868 
101.10 
0.0000 
0.358 
2682 / 77 
-802.282 
151.48 
0.0000 
0.183 
1259 / 76 
-331.427 
112.07 
0.0000 
0.281 
 
Note: Marginal effects are displayed with standard errors of the marginal effects in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  # indicates significance at the 12% level. 
 
Table 4 shows that having the best score in the triad increases the probability of receiving 
the high payoff by 31.72% in the Baseline, and by 34.95% in the Ingratiation treatment.  
These probabilities naturally decrease in the case of ties.  Being the worst performer in the 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.32
29 
 
triad is sanctioned but only in the Baseline and this is borderline significant.  The importance 
of opinion distance is striking: having the closest distance increases the chance of receiving 
the high payoff by 22.29% in the Baseline and by 9.77% in the Ingratiation treatment (the 
effects remain the same when we exclude ties in score rank 1).  This indicates both that a 
lower opinion distance is always rewarded but that managers take less account of this 
dimension when it may result from ingratiation.  This is also supported by the fact that the 
absolute value of the opinion distance exerts a negative influence only in the Baseline 
treatment.  This negative effect is reinforced when opinions are about policy topics (also 
observed in the Ingratiation treatment when ties are excluded).  A worker’s more liberal 
opinion on migration policy is rewarded more than a more conservative one.  There is no 
additional effect of having the first opinion (score) rank in case of a tie in the best score 
(opinion, respectively) rank. 
Next, we build a tentative typology of payoff assignment functions.  For each manager, 
we estimate the α and β parameters of our model by means of a conditional Logit model of 
the decision to assign the high payoff to a specific worker with robust standard errors.  We 
include all the periods in which the manager looked at both scores and opinions.
25
  To retain 
the maximum number of observations,
 
we pool the data from the Baseline and Ingratiation 
treatments.
26
  The value of α is given by the marginal effect of opinion rank 1 and the value of 
β by the marginal effect of score rank 1.  In Figure 3, a dot on the vertical (horizontal) axis 
means that the manager is influenced by the best rank in score (opinion) while the marginal 
effect of the best rank in opinion (score) is not different from 0.  
 
 
                                                 
25
 This excludes only one manager who looked exclusively at the opinions of the workers throughout the game. 
26
 The minimum number of observations is 33 and the maximum 72.  We acknowledge that pooling treatments 
may bias coefficients, since opinion rank matters less in the Ingratiation treatment. 
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Fig.  3.  Distribution of managers’ α and β (marginal effects of a conditional Logit model) 
We identify four main types with the 71 managers for whom we reach convergence (out 
of 78).  A first type includes 21 managers (29.58%) who are influenced by the best score rank 
but not by opinion rank; 20 of them are meritocratic managers (α=0, β>0) whereas one 
outlier sanctions the best performers.  A second type includes 24 managers (33.80%) who are 
influenced by both the score and the opinion ranks (α>0, β>0).  22 of these are weakly 
meritocratic and two outliers sanction the best performers.  The third type includes 11 
managers (15.49%) who are only influenced by the best opinion rank.  10 of them are 
opinion-oriented managers (α>0, β=0) whereas one sanctions opinion conformity.  A final 
type includes 15 indifferent managers (21.13%) who reward no specific dimension  (α=β=0) . 
Is there a social cost to managers’ favoritism of opinion conformity in terms of a 
reduction in effort over time?  This could be the case if workers revise downward their beliefs 
on the expected return of a high performance.  We test this hypothesis with an OLS model 
with robust standard errors clustered at the worker level in which the score is the dependent 
variable.  The time trend is not significant in any treatment.
27
  This does not, however, 
                                                 
27
 We tried several specifications, with the data of the three treatments pooled together or not.  The independent 
variables included the time trend alone, or the time trend interacting with each treatment, dummies for each 
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constitute a definitive answer.  Indeed, in our experiment the workers are randomly re-
matched with a manager in each period; provided there exists a sufficient share of 
meritocratic managers in the population, maintaining effort is rational. In addition, they do 
not know whether they are outperformed by another worker.    
We summarize our results as follows: 
Result 4.  A majority of managers are meritocratic or weakly meritocratic but a large 
minority of managers favor similarly-oriented workers.  This supports Proposition 4. 
Result 5.  Managers reward opinion conformity less when workers can conform strategically.  
This supports Proposition 5. 
Result 6.  When ingratiation is impossible, managers sanction a higher distance more when 
workers’ opinions on highly debated topics are more conservative.   
4.3.  Policy interventions  
Three interventions introduce respectively a variation in the task that facilitates the 
comparison of workers’ performance and reduces the role of luck (Policy 1), or a financial 
cost for changing one’s opinion (Policy 2), or performance pay for the manager (Policy 3).  
We first test whether these changes modify the workers’ ingratiatory behavior.  Figure 4 
represents the relative frequency of changes in opinion, by treatment.   
                                                                                                                                                        
treatment, the distance in opinion, and opinion topics.  No variable was ever significant, although in the Baseline 
the time trend was negative and significant at a threshold of 11% or 12%, according to the models.  Results are 
available upon request.   
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Fig.  4.  Relative frequency of changes in opinion, by treatment 
Figure 4 shows that a major change occurs only after introducing a financial cost of 
changing opinion.  The share of workers who do not change opinion increases from 36.82% 
in the initial Ingratiation treatment, to 63.70% in the Ingratiation-Policy 2 treatment 
(p<0.001), and from 59.78% in the Random treatment to 94.57% in the Random-Policy 2 
treatment (p<0.001). Such a cost eliminates non-strategic conformism and reduces 
ingratiation.  In contrast, the other policy interventions do not affect ingratiatory behaviors. 
This is confirmed by multinomial Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
probability of a worker increasing, keeping constant or decreasing the distance in opinion 
with the manager.
28
  Compared with the initial Ingratiation treatment, the introduction of a 
cost diminishes the probability of shortening the distance in opinion by 30.15%; the other 
manipulations exert no significant impact.  Compared with the initial Random treatment, the 
introduction of a cost reduces the probability of shortening the distance in opinion by 24.95%.  
With the initial Random treatment as the reference, the probability of shortening the distance 
is increased by 28.33% in the initial Ingratiation treatment, 30.62% in the Ingratiation-
Policy 1 treatment, 31.90% in the Ingratiation-Policy 3 treatment; while there is no significant 
                                                 
28
 Dummy variables for the new treatments are added to the independent variables included in the models 
reported in Table 2, as well as a variable interacting the score with the Policy 1 treatment since scores are 
measured on a larger scale in this treatment. The regressions are reported in Table A2 in Appendix. 
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difference with the Ingratiation-Policy 2 treatment.  The reduction of the distance remains 
driven by the initial distance, a lower strength of initial opinions, and a highly-debated topic.  
These results are also supported by Tobit estimates of the ingratiation index (see Table A3 in 
Appendix).  It should also be noted that introducing a cost for changing one’s opinion or 
managerial performance pay exerts no significant impact on the workers’ scores (Mann-
Whitney tests). 
Finally, we study whether managers’ behavior is affected by the new treatments by re-
estimating the determinants of which worker is assigned the high payoff.  Table 5 reports the 
marginal effects of conditional Logit models similar to Table 4, with separate regressions 
excluding ties in score rank.
29
  
Table 5.  Determinants of which worker receives the high payoff in the policy treatments – 
Conditional Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the manager level 
 
Dependent 
variable:  
p(high payoff) 
Policy 1 (1) Policy  2 (2) Policy 3 (3) 
All obs. Excluding 
ties  
All obs. Excluding 
ties 
All obs. Excluding 
ties 
Score rank 1 
 
Score rank 3 
 
Opinion rank 1 
 
Opinion rank 3 
 
Reported 
opinion distance  
0.363***  
(0.049) 
0.136** 
(0.059) 
0.162***  
(0.028) 
0.066  
(0.046) 
-0.007***  
(0.002) 
0.354*** 
(0.052) 
0.120** 
(0.060) 
0.196*** 
(0.031) 
0.015  
(0.044) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.468*** 
(0.051) 
-0.014 
(0.097) 
0.065 
 (0.060) 
0.019 
(0.060) 
-0.007** 
(0.004) 
0.481*** 
(0.063) 
0.039 
 (0.146) 
0.142#  
(0.088) 
0.075  
(0.081) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.452*** 
(0.059) 
-0.044 
(0.074) 
0.168*** 
 (0.034) 
0.010 
(0.036) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.503*** 
(0.061) 
-0.117 
 (0.090) 
0.191***  
(0.033) 
-0.004  
(0.045) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
N 
Nb of clusters 
Log pseudo-lik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
1038 
15 
-286.445 
88.93 
0.0000 
0.246 
822 
15 
-215.185 
85.18 
0.0000 
0.285 
468 
13 
-118.469 
71.99 
0.0000 
0.309 
216 
13 
-44.758 
40.81 
0.0000 
0.434 
1254 
19 
-260.532 
85.32 
0.0000 
0.433 
945 
19 
-183.381 
304.87 
0.0000 
0.470 
 
Note: Marginal effects are displayed with standard errors in parentheses.  #, *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 11%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Policy 1 increases the comparability of the workers’ 
                                                 
29
 In the Baseline treatments, the share of the best performers who receive the high payoff is 42.49% in the 
initial treatment, 45.99% in Policy 1 (p=0.447) and 51.56% in Policy 3 (p=0.012); excluding ties, these values 
are 56.68%, 61.54% (p=0.651), and 77.88% (p=0.004), respectively.  In the Ingratiation treatments, these 
proportions are 46.55% in the initial treatment, 50.18% in Policy 1 (p=0.208), 49.45% in Policy 2 (p=0.332), and 
53.83% in Policy 3 (p=0.109); excluding ties, these percentages are 67.57%, 69.52% (p=0.992), 75.0% 
(p=0.223), and 83.62% (p<0.001), respectively. 
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performance; Policy 2 introduces a cost for changing one’s opinion; Policy 3 links the manager’s payoff to the 
triad’s performance.  Models (1) and (3) pool the data from the Baseline- and Random- Policy 1 treatments; 
Model (2) only includes the data from the Ingratiation- Policy 2 treatment. 
Table 5 attests to the importance of holding the best score rank for getting the high payoff.  
The weight of the relative performance is strengthened, notably when managers receive 
performance pay.
30
 Managerial incentives benefit the highest productivity workers also 
because in contrast with the initial treatment, managers ask more frequently for information 
on scores exclusively (11.84% in the Ingratiation-Policy 3 treatment vs. 1.39% in the 
Ingratiation treatment; 7.46% in the Baseline-Policy 3 treatment vs. 5.26% in the Baseline; 
p<0.001 for pooled treatments).  But Table 5 also confirms the still significant importance of 
the best opinion rank in the assignment of payoffs in these treatments, not only for breaking 
ties between the best performers.  And a larger distance in opinion is still sanctioned.  
Surprisingly however, managers do not pay attention to opinion ranks when workers have to 
pay to change their opinion; a possible explanation is that this cost makes the possibility of 
ingratiation more salient in the instructions. 
This supports our last results. 
Result 7.  Increasing the financial cost of ingratiation makes conformity less likely.  This 
supports Proposition 3. 
Result 8.  Introducing managerial performance pay and reducing the role of luck in workers’ 
relative performance increase dramatically the weight of relative performance in the 
assignment of payoffs.  This supports Proposition 6.  This is not sufficient, however, to 
counteract favoritism of opinion conformity.   
 
                                                 
30
 Estimating the same model on the initial treatments gives a marginal effect of 33.34% for the best score rank 
and 22.81% for the best opinion rank in the Baseline (33.51% and 24.82%, respectively, when excluding ties).  
The marginal effect is 30.56% for the best score rank and 9.50% for the best opinion rank in the Ingratiation 
treatment (31.33% and 10.49%, respectively, when excluding ties). 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Confirming our theoretical predictions, our controlled experiment provides evidence for the 
fact that workers conform strategically to the opinion of managers and that managers reward 
workers’ proximity in opinion in addition to relative performance.  This reveals that social 
distance is a vector of both ingratiation and favoritism.  This confirms in an economically-
controlled setting the evidence obtained in social psychology of the effect of ingratiation on 
career success, career advancement, higher salary increases, or boardroom appointments 
(Gordon, 1996; Higgins et al., 2003; Westphal and Stern, 2006).  This also confirms the 
importance of social distance that has been found in social preferences (Chen and Li, 2009), 
in cooperation induced by social connections (Bandiera et al., 2005; 2009) and team identity 
(Eckel and Grossman, 2005), and in competition (Dutcher, 2011).  Proximity is, however, 
rewarded less when managers suspect brownnosing. Favoritism behavior also reacts to a 
change in managerial incentives, as performance pay for managers motivates them to put 
more weight on workers’ relative performance in the assignment of earnings.  A better 
measure of relative performance also contributes to increasing the reward of merit.  
Ingratiation can be reduced by increasing its moral and financial costs.   
Our experiment helps to identify some reasons for managers to reward smaller social 
distance.  Rewarding opinion proximity offers a solution when several workers achieve a 
similar performance (on discrimination as a tie-breaking rule, see also Filippin and Guala, 
2011, and de Haan et al., 2011) and when individual performance is an imprecise indicator of 
workers’ effort or ability.  It is used as an alternative to random selection among the best 
performers.  We predict that favoritism is more widespread when the pool of competitors for 
a prize is more homogenous, when the spread in performance between competitors is very 
small, and when the idiosyncratic random uncertainty is large.  A second reason is related to a 
taste for similarity or homophily. Managers value workers more who express similar 
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opinions, especially when these opinions relate to socially debated topics. Social 
psychologists have shown how similarity in values increases liking and interpersonal 
attraction (Byrne et al., 1966; Liden and Mitchell, 1988).  This increases ego-utility. 
Our experimental design is based on one-shot interactions between managers and 
workers.  Therefore, we cannot observe the longer-term effect of favoritism and ingratiation 
on employees’ effort levels.  A first natural extension would be to introduce repeated 
interactions.  The dynamics of ingratiation and favoritism over time could have a negative 
impact on the effort of able workers who are passed over in favor of less able employees and 
who become aware of this over time.  But it could also exert a positive effect on favored 
agents if they want to self-justify their better treatment.  In addition, a smaller social distance 
may facilitate communication and coordination (see notably Efferson et al., 2008), notably 
when tasks involve problem-solving.  Another possible extension consists of manipulating the 
visibility of changes in opinions.  Making the change of opinion visible to the other workers 
would probably reduce the frequency of ingratiatory behavior.  Making it visible to the 
manager might influence her subsequent decisions, especially if they imply a trusting 
relationship with the worker.   
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APPENDIX 1 – Instructions for the Ingratiation - Random treatments31 
 
We thank you for participating in this experiment on economic decision-making.  During this experiment you 
can earn a certain amount of money.  All the transactions and payoffs are expressed in points.  Your gains in 
points in all the periods of all parts will be added up and converted into Euros according to the following rate:  
18 points = €1  
or 1 point = €0.0556  
In addition to the earnings you will make during the experiment, you will receive a €4 show-up fee.  Your 
payoffs will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the session.  All your decisions during the session 
will remain anonymous.  You will never have to enter your name in the computer.   
The experiment consists of three parts.  These instructions are related to the first part of the experiment.  The 
instructions relative to the other parts of the experiment will be distributed after the first part will have been 
completed.   
Part 1  
During this part, you will have to answer four questions.  Your answers to these questions will be called your 
“preferences”.  These four questions will be displayed in a random order. 
Question on painting 
A painting will be displayed on your computer screen during a minimum of 20 seconds and a maximum of two 
minutes.   
After watching this painting, you will have to indicate how you liked it on a graduated scale from 1 (« I hate it») 
to 100 (« I adore it »).   
Question on music 
You will listen to a piece of music during a minimum of 20 seconds and a maximum of two minutes.   
After listening, you will have to indicate how you liked it on a graduated scale from 1 (« I hate it») to 100 (« I 
adore it »).   
Questions on policy issues  
You will have to express your opinion on two policy issues.  You express your opinion on a graduated scale 
from 1 (« extremely unfavorable») to 100 (« extremely favorable »).   
We ask you to answer these questions with sincerity.  Your answers will be used in the second part of the 
experiment.  We remind you that all your answers in this experiment will remain anonymous. 
When you have answered these questions on your preferences, you will have to answer to a series of 
complementary questions.  Your answers to these questions will not be used in the remaining of the experiment.   
---- 
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants throughout the experiment.  Any attempt to 
communicate may lead to the exclusion from the session without any compensation. 
If you have any question related to the first part of the experiment, please raise your hand.  We will answer your 
questions in private.   
----- 
Part 2 (distributed after part 1 was completed) 
This part consists of 12 periods and involves two roles.   
During this part, you are either a participant A, or a participant B.  This role is assigned randomly.  It is 
displayed on your computer screen.  You keep the same role throughout this part. 
In each period, we form groups of four participants.  Each group consists of one participant A and three 
participants B.  The composition of groups is rematched randomly at the beginning of each period.   
                                                 
31
 The instructions for the other treatments and sessions are available upon request to the authors. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.32
41 
 
In each group, the role of participants B is to perform a task.  Then, the role of participant A is to decide on the 
assignment of two possible payoffs to participants B. 
o Description of each period 
One period consists of four stages. 
In the first stage, the preference of the participant A expressed in response to one of the four questions in the 
first part (the preference regarding either the painting, the piece of music, or one of the two social issues) is 
displayed on the computer screen of his group members. 
In the second stage, each participant B has to perform a task.  This task consists of answering two questions 
randomly drawn from a general knowledge quiz including a hundred items.  The questions may differ across 
participants.  A few examples are displayed in the Table below. 
What is the oldest auction house in the world? 
- Christie's 
- Sotheby's 
- Bonhams 
 
Which tennis tournament does not belong to the grand slam? 
- The US Open 
- the Monte Carlo Masters Series 
- the Wimbledon tournament 
 
What is the capital of Italy? 
- Paris 
- Londres 
- Rome 
 
The number of correct answers (0, 1 or 2) determines the participant B’s « score » for the current period.  Each 
participant B is informed of his own score. 
In the third stage, each participant B is reminded on his computer screen of the preference he has expressed in 
part 1 in response to the question selected in the first stage.  He can change this preference before it is 
communicated to the participant A.   
In the fourth stage, the participant A must decide which of the three participants B will receive a payoff of 10 
points for the period.  The two other participants will receive a payoff of 5 points.  If he wishes, before making 
his decision, the participant A can be informed on the scores of the three participants B (their number of correct 
answers in the quiz) and/or on the preferences they have expressed in stage 3 regarding the question selected in 
stage 1 of this period.   
o How are payoffs calculated in each period? 
In each group:  
- The participant A earns 12 points.   
- The participant B selected by the participant A earns 10 points. 
- The two other participants B earn 5 points each.   
o What does change from one period to the next?  
At the beginning of each period, the groups of four participants are rematched randomly.  There are always one 
participant A and three participants B in each group.  Each participant keeps the same role (participant A or 
participant B) in all the periods in this part. 
The reference question (relative to the painting, the piece of music or the two social issues) may change in each 
period. 
Please read these instructions.  If you have any question, please raise your hand.  We will answer your questions 
in private.   
----- 
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Part 3 (distributed after part 2 was completed) 
The instructions for the third part of the experiment are similar to the instructions for part 2, except regarding the 
fourth stage.  Now, the participant B who receives the payoff of 10 points is selected randomly. 
To summarize:  
- The third part consists of 12 periods.   
- You keep the same role as in the second part. 
- The groups are rematched randomly in each period. 
- In each period, one of the four questions of the first part, relative to the painting, the piece of music or one of 
the social issues, is selected.   
- The participant A’s preference regarding the selected question is displayed on the computer screen of all the 
group members.   
- The participants B perform a task.  It consists of answering to two questions extracted from a general 
knowledge quiz and that differ across participants B.  The numbers of their correct answers constitute the 
scores of participants B.   
- The participants B can change the preference they have expressed in part 1 relative to the question selected in 
stage 1 of the current period. 
- A random draw determines which of the three participants B will receive the payoff of 10 points in the current 
period.  The two other participants B will receive the payoff of 5 points.  If he wishes, before the random draw, 
the participant A can be informed on the scores of the three participants B (their number of correct answers in 
the quiz) and/or on the preferences they have expressed in stage 3 regarding the question selected in stage 1 of 
this period.   
Please read again these instructions.  If you have any question, please raise your hand.  We will answer your 
questions in private.   
After the 12 periods have been completed, we will ask you to answer a few demographic questions.  Please 
remain seated until we invite you to leave the laboratory.   
 
---- 
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APPENDIX 2.  TABLES 
Table A1.  Characteristics of the experimental sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 
number 
Number of 
participants 
Treatments/order 
1 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
2 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
3 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
4 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
5 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
6 16 Baseline-Ingratiation 
7 16 Ingratiation-Baseline 
8 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
9 20 Ingratiation-Random 
10 20 Random-Ingratiation 
11 16 Random-Ingratiation 
12 12 Ingratiation-Random 
13 20 Ingratiation-Random 
14 16 Ingratiation-Random 
15 20 Ingratiation-Random 
16 16 Random-Ingratiation 
17 20 Random-Ingratiation 
18 12 Ingratiation-Baseline - Policy 1 
19 16 Ingratiation-Baseline - Policy 1 
20 20 Baseline-Ingratiation - Policy 1 
21 12 Baseline-Ingratiation - Policy 1 
22 16 Ingratiation-Random - Policy 2 
23 16 Ingratiation-Random - Policy 2 
24 20 Ingratiation-Random - Policy 2 
25 12 Ingratiation-Baseline - Policy 3 
26 20 Ingratiation-Baseline - Policy 3 
27 16 Ingratiation-Baseline - Policy 3 
28 12 Baseline-Ingratiation - Policy 3 
29 16 Baseline-Ingratiation - Policy 3 
TOTAL 500  
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Table A2.  Determinants of the probability to change opinion distance in Policy treatments - 
Multinomial Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the worker level 
Ref.  = no 
change in 
distance 
Ingratiation and Random 
treatments (1) 
Ingratiation treatment 
(2) 
Random treatment 
(3) 
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance  
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance 
Increased 
distance 
Decreased 
distance 
Ingratiation 
treatment 
Ingratiation 
Policy 1 
Ingratiation 
Policy 2 
Ingratiation 
Policy 3 
Random 
Policy 2 
Score 
 
Score in Ingrat.  
Policy 1 
Initial distance  
Squared initial 
distance  
Strength of the  
initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Negative initial 
diff.*painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial 
diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon 
tax 
Negative initial 
diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
 
Period 
 
Female 
-0.022**  
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.053*** 
(0.008) 
-0.015*** 
 (0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
0.0001*** 
 (<0.0001) 
-0.003*  
(0.002) 
-0.023** 
 (0.010) 
0.0019 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
 (0.009) 
-0.011 
 (0.012) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.013 
 (0.016) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.283*** 
(0.030) 
0.306*** 
(0.058) 
-0.028 
(0.058) 
0.319*** 
(0.048) 
-0.407*** 
(0.031) 
0.002 
 (0.011) 
0.013 
(0.027) 
0.022*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.0002*** 
 (<0.0001) 
-0.022*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.012  
(0.028) 
0.042  
(0.039) 
0.107*** 
 (0.028) 
-0.078** 
(0.035) 
0.029 
 (0.027) 
-0.051 
 (0.036) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
0.0004 
 (0.002) 
0.044 
(0.032) 
- 
- 
0.030 
(0.030) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
- 
- 
-0.016*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.007*** 
 (0.001) 
0.0001*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.003* 
 (0.002) 
-0.015 
 (0.010) 
0.009 
 (0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.027***  
(0.010) 
-0.021** 
 (0.009) 
0.029  
(0.020) 
-0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.001 
 (0.001) 
-0.031*** 
 (0.010) 
- 
- 
0.030 
(0.066) 
-0.301*** 
(0.046) 
0.056 
(0.053) 
- 
- 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.029) 
0.028*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.0003*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.020*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.024 
 (0.030) 
0.036 
 (0.042) 
0.084***  
(0.029) 
-0.037  
(0.041) 
0.037 
 (0.029) 
-0.068*  
(0.040) 
-0.006 
(0.035) 
-0.001 
 (0.002) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.072*** 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
 (0.006) 
- 
- 
-0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
0.0001*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.004** 
 (0.002) 
-0.031** 
 (0.014) 
0.013 
 (0.026) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.002 
 (0.014) 
-0.036**  
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
0.001 
 (0.001) 
-0.010 
 (0.016) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.249*** 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
- 
- 
0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.0001*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.018*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.005 
 (0.034) 
0.082 
 (0.051) 
0.071** 
(0.035) 
-0.064** 
(0.037) 
-0.004 
 (0.036) 
0.013 
(0.049) 
0.021 
(0.040) 
0.003 
 (0.002) 
0.038 
(0.037) 
N (by category) 
Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
6094 (403-2889-2802)  
375 
-4585.583 
576.77 
0.0000 
0.155 
4438 (340-1746-2352) 
375 
-3426.585 
551.18 
0.0000 
0.142 
1882 (135-1297-450) 
120 
-1300.136 
135.56 
0.0000 
0.123 
 
Note: The table reports the marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  The number of observations (N) by 
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category refers to the number of observations in which workers increase the distance, keep the 
distance stable and decrease the distance, respectively. 
 
Table A3.  Determinants of the ingratiation index - Tobit models with robust standard errors 
clustered at the worker level, with Policy treatments  
 
Dependent variable: 
Ingratiation index 
 
Ingratiation and 
random treatments 
(1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment  
(2) 
Random  
treatment  
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment (initial) 
Ingratiation - Policy 1 
Ingratiation - Policy 2 
Ingratiation - Policy 3 
Random - Policy 2 
Score 
Score in Ingratiation - Policy 1 
Strength of the initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Negative initial diff.*painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative initial diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Constant 
 
0.536*** (0.058) 
0.496***(0.106) 
0.131 (0.119) 
0.618*** (0.093) 
-0.939*** (0.148) 
-0.025 (0.019) 
0.065 (0.045) 
-0.030*** (0.008) 
0.005 (0.045) 
0.773 (0.062) 
0.228*** (0.046) 
-0.183*** (0.061) 
0.040 (0.044) 
-0.039 (0.060) 
-0.020 (0.046) 
0.005 (0.003) 
0.045 (0.056) 
-0.141 (0.096) 
- 
-0.102 (0.093) 
-0.434*** (0.107) 
0.096 (0.082) 
- 
-0.004 (0.022) 
0.072 (0.047) 
-0.021*** (0.008) 
0.081 (0.052) 
-0.039 (0.070) 
0.288*** (0.053) 
-0.220*** (0.066) 
0.129*** (0.050) 
-0.147** (0.068) 
-0.008 (0.058) 
0.003 (0.004) 
0.056 (0.057) 
0.255*** (0.089) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-1.279*** (0.198) 
0.019 (0.049) 
- 
-0.051*** (0.018) 
-0.0003 (0.127) 
0.050 (0.148) 
0.405*** (0.122) 
-0.570*** (0.170) 
-0.022 (0.125) 
-0.161 (0.168) 
0.093 (0.125) 
0.001 (0.009) 
0.246** (0.120) 
-0.296 (0.194) 
N 
Left-censored obs. 
Right censored obs. 
Nb of clusters 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
F 
Prob>F 
Pseudo R
2
 
5699 
2897 
535 
375 
-5034.264 
13.38 
0.0000 
0.086 
4333 
1887 
558 
375 
-4325.558 
4.55 
0.0000 
0.019 
1865 
1355 
131 
120 
-1265.627 
5.75 
0.0000 
0.084 
 
Note: The data exclude the observations in which the worker has the same initial opinion as the manager and 
those in which the worker increased his distance with the manager.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  # indicates borderline significance 
at the 11% level. 
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Figure 1A.  Distribution of the frequency of differences in initial opinions between the 
managers and the workers, by topic, all treatments included 
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